Large repositories of data contain sensitive information which must be protected against unauthorized access. The protection of the con dentiality of this information has been a long-term goal for the database security research community and the government statistical agencies. Recent advances, in data mining and machine learning algorithms, have increased the disclosure risks one may encounter when releasing data to outside parties.
Introduction
Many government agencies, businesses and non-pro t organizations in order to support their short and long term planning activities, they are searching for a way to collect, analyze and report data about individuals, households or businesses. Information systems, therefore, contain con dential information such as social security numbers, income, credit ratings, type of disease, customer purchases, etc. The necessity to combine the con dentiality and the legitimate needs of data users is imperative. Every disclosure limitation method has an impact, which is not always a positive one, on true data values and relationships. Ideally, these e ects can be quanti ed so that their anticipated impact on the completeness and validity of the data can guide the selection and use of the disclosure limitation method. The increasing capacity of storing large amounts of data and the necessity to analyze them to support planning activities, have largely contributed to the di usion of data mining techniques and related methodologies. The elicitation of knowledge, that can be attained by such techniques, has been the focus of the Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) researchers' e ort for years and by now it is a well understood problem 1]. On the other hand, the impact of the information con dentiality originating by these techniques has not been considered until very recently. The process of uncovering hidden patterns from large databases was rst indicated as a threat to database security, by O' Leary 2] , in a paper presented in the 1 st International Conference in Knowledge Discovery and Databases. Piatetsky-Shapiro, in GTE Laboratories, was the chair of a mini-symposium on knowledge discovery in databases and privacy, organized around the issues raised in O' Leary's paper in 1991. The focal point discussed by the panel was the limitation of disclosure of personal information, which is not di erent in concept from the focal point of statisticians and database researchers since, in many elds like medical and socio-economic research, the goal is not to discover patterns about speci c individuals but patterns about groups. The compromise, in the con dentiality of sensitive information that is not limited to patterns speci c to individuals, (that can also be performed by newly developed data mining techniques), is another form of threat which is analyzed in a recent paper by Clifton from Mitre Corporation and Marks from Department of Defense 6] . The authors provide a well designed scenario of how di erent data mining techniques can be used in a business setting to provide business competitors with an advantage. For completeness purposes we describe the scenario below. Let us suppose, that we are negotiating a deal with Dedtrees Paper Company, as purchasing directors of BigMart, a large supermarket chain. They o er their products in reduced price, if we agree to give them access to our database of customer purchases. We accept the deal. Dedtrees now starts mining our data. By using an association rule mining tool, they nd that people who purchase skim milk also purchase Green paper. Dedtrees now runs a coupon marketing campaign saying that \you can get 50 cents o skim milk with every purchase of a Dedtrees product". This campaign cuts heavily into the sales of Green paper, which increases the prices to us, based on the lower sales. During our next negotiation with Dedtrees, we nd out that with reduced competition they are unwilling to o er us a low price. Finally, we start to lose business to our competitors, who were able to negotiate a better deal with Green paper. The scenario that has just been presented, indicates the need to prevent disclosure not only of con dential personal information from summarized or aggregated data, but also to prevent data mining techniques from discovering sensitive knowledge which is not even known to the database owners. We should recognize though, that the access of a company like the Dedtrees, is in general worthwhile since it improves the e ciency of distribution, lowers the costs and helps to predict inventory needs, even if that gives to Dedtrees the bene t of reducing competition. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present an overview of the current approaches to the problem of DM and security. Section 3 gives a formalization of the problem, while some solutions are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses performance and results obtained from the applications of the devised algorithms. Issues, concerning the implementation of the algorithms, are discussed in section 6. Concluding remarks and future extensions are listed in section 7.
Background and Related Work
The security impact of DM is analyzed in 6] and some possible approaches to the problem of inference and discovery of sensitive knowledge in a data mining context are suggested. The proposed strategies include fuzzyfying the source database, augmenting the source database and limiting access to the source database by releasing only samples of the original data. Clifton in 7] adopts the last approach. In his paper, he studies the correlation between the amount of released data and the signi cance of the patterns which are discovered. He also shows how to determine the sample size in such a way that data mining tools cannot obtain reliable results. Clifton and Marks in 6] also recognize the necessity of studying mining algorithms in order to increase the e ciency of any adopted strategy that deals with disclosure limitation of sensitive data and knowledge. The analysis of the mining techniques should be considered as the rst step in the problem of security maintenance: if it is known which selection criteria are used to measure rules relevance it will be easier to identify what must be done to protect sensitive information from being disclosed. While the solution, which is proposed by Clifton in 7] , is independent from any speci c data mining technique, other researchers 8, 9] propose solutions that prevent disclosure of con dential information for speci c data mining algorithms such as association rule mining and classi cation rule mining. Classi cation mining algorithms may use sensitive data to rank objects; each group of objects has a description given by a combination of non-sensitive attributes. The sets of descriptions, obtained for a certain value of the sensitive attribute are referred to as description space. For Decision-Region based algorithms, the description space generated by each value of the sensitive attribute, can be determined a priori. The authors, in 8], rst identify two major criteria which can be used to assess the output of a classi cation inference system and then use these criteria in the context of Decision-Region based algorithms, to inspect and also to modify, if necessary, the description of a sensitive object, so that they can be sure that it's safe. Disclosure limitation of sensitive knowledge by mining algorithms, that are based on the retrieval of association rules, has been studied in a di erent research work. The authors, in 9], propose to prevent disclosure of sensitive knowledge by decreasing the significance of the rules induced by such algorithms. Towards this end, they apply a group of heuristic solutions for reducing the number of occurrences, (also referred to as support) of some frequent (large) groups of items, which are selected by the database security guard, below a minimum user speci ed threshold. Because an association rule mining algorithm discovers association rules from large sets of items only, by decreasing the support of the selected sets of items has as a consequence that the selected rules escape from the mining. This approach focuses on the rst step of the rules mining process, which is the discovery of large itemsets. The second step of the same process (e.g. the derivation of strong rules form frequent sets of items) is the starting point of the approach we will present in this paper.
Problem Formulation
Let I = fi 1 ; ::; i n g be a set of literals, called items. Let D be a database of transactions, where each transaction T is an itemset such that T I. A unique identi er, which we call it TID, is associated with each transaction. We say that a transaction T supports X, a set of items in I, if X T. We as- a measure of the frequency of a rule, the con dence is a measure of the strength of the relation between sets of items. Association rule mining algorithms rely on support and con dence when they are searching for implications among sets of items. In this way, algorithms do not retrieve all the association rules that may be derivable from a database, but only a very small subset that satis es the requirements set by the users. This is actually used as a form of searching bias, in order for the mining algorithm to be computationally more e cient. An association rule-mining algorithm works as follows. It nds all the sets of items that appear frequently enough, so as to be considered relevant and then derive from them the association rules that are strong enough to be considered interesting. We aim at preventing some of these rules, that we refer to as "sensitive rules", from being disclosed. The problem can be stated as follows:
Given a database D, a set R of relevant rules that are mined from D and a subset R h of R, how can we transform D into a database D 0 in such a way that the rules in R can still be mined, except for the rules in R h ?
In 9] the authors demonstrated that solving this problem (also referred to as \sanitization" problem) is NP-hard; thus, we look for a transformation of D (the source database) in D 0 (the released database) that maximizes the number of rules in R ? R h that can still be mined. There are two main approaches that can be adopted when we try to hide a set R h of rules: we can either prevent the rules in R h from being generated, by hiding the frequent sets from which they are derived, or we can reduce their con dence by bringing it below a user-speci ed threshold (min conf). In this paper we propose three strategies to hide rules using the both approach; work related to the former approach can also be found in 9]. T1 ABC  T2 ABC  T3 ABC  T4 AB  T5 A  T6 AC   Table 1 : Database D
TID Items

Proposed Solutions and Algorithms
For the simplicity of presentation and without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions in the development of the algorithms:
We want to hide association rules by decreasing either their support or their con dence.
We select to decrease either the support or the con dence based on the side e ects on the information that is not sensitive.
We hide one rule at a time.
We decrease either the support or the con dence one unit at a time.
We are interested in hiding disjoint rules only.
According to the rst assumption we can choose to hide a rule by changing either its con dence or its support, but not both. By using this assumption, we can consistently evaluate each technique without any interactions from other heuristics. Based on the second assumption, in order to decrease the con dence or the support of a rule, either we turn to 0 the value of a non-zero item in a speci c transaction, or we turn to 1 all the zero items in a transaction that partially supports an itemset. The third assumption states that the hiding of one rule must be considered as an atomic operation. This implies that the hiding of two separate rules should take place in a sequential manner, by hiding one rule after the other. This assumption facilitates the analysis and the evaluation of the algorithms. Note that in some cases, this approach may not give results as good as the ones we get when using a dynamic scheme, in which the list of rules to be hidden can dynamically be reordered after each iteration. The fourth assumption is based on the minimality of changes in the original database. By changing the con dence or the support of each rule, one step at a time, we act proactively in minimizing the side-e ects of the hiding heuristics.
The fth assumption states that we hide only rules that involve disjoint sets of items. In a di erent situation, interactions among the rules (i.e., common subsets of items) should be considered beforehand. The rest of this section is organized as follows: in Section 4.1 we introduce the required notation, in Section 4.2 we introduce three strategies that solve the problem of hiding association rules, by tuning the con dence and the support of these rules, while the building blocks of the algorithms that implement those strategies, are presented in Section 4.3.
Notation
Before presenting the solution strategies, we introduce some notation. Each database transaction is a triple: t=<TID, list of elements, size> where TID is the identi er of the transaction t and list of elements is a list with one element for each item in the database. Each element has value 1 if the corresponding item is supported by the transaction and 0 otherwise. Size is the number of elements in the list of elements having value 1 (e.g., the number of elements supported by the transaction T1  111  3  T2  111  3  T3  111  3  T4  110  2  T5  100  1  T6  101  2   Table 2 : Database D using the speci ed notation.
least one of the non-zero elements of t.list of elements that correspond to S. By choosing the minimum number of elements to modify (i.e., 1), we minimize the impact of hiding a sensitive rule in the database. In the example above, in order to decrease the support of S using q, we can turn to 0 the element corresponding to C, obtaining q=< T2, 1100], 2 >. 
The Three Hiding Strategies
Given a rule X ) Y , we can write its con dence in terms of its support as follows:
Starting from this relationship between the condence and the support of a rule, we develop three strategies to hide a rule:
1. We decrease the con dence of the rule 
Example
Supposing that we have the database D shown in Table 1 . According to the notation introduced above, the representation of the database is given in Table  2 ). Given that min supp=2/6=33% and min conf= 70% we are interested in hiding the rule AC ) B,
with support = 50%, and con dence = 75%. 
Algorithms and Data Structures
We now present the algorithms for the previously introduced strategies. For each algorithm we specify Table 4 : The rules derived from the large itemsets of Table 3 the input and output requirements and we give a brief description of the data structures needed.
Algorithm 1.a
This algorithm hides sensitive rules according to the rst strategy: for each selected rule, it increases the support of the rule's antecedent until the rule condence decreases below the min conf threshold. Figure  1 shows the sketch of this algorithm; a re nement of the algorithm is depicted in Figure 2 . In both Figure   1 and 2 we used the compact notation lhs(U) to represent the itemset on the left side of a rule U (also referred to as \rule antecedent").
The database D and the set T of transactions that partially support the left hand side of the rule, have been implemented as arrays of references to transactions. Each transaction is represented as an array with one eld for the transaction ID (TID), one eld for the transaction size and also one eld for the list of items that are supported by this transaction. According to the notation introduced in the previous section, the set of items contained in a transaction has been represented as a list with one element for each literal appearing in the database. Each element has value 1 if the transaction supports the corresponding item, and 0 if it does not. We implemented the list of elements as an hash structure, with items for keys and integers for values.
For the set R h we used an array of references to rules. Figure 1 : Sketch of Algorithm 1.a Each rule is implemented as an array that stores (a) the rule con dence, (b) the reference to the itemset from which the rule has been derived and (c) the references to the large itemsets that appear in the left and right side of the rule.
Algorithm 1.b
This algorithm hides sensitive rules in accordance to the second of the proposed strategies. It reduces the support of each selected rule by decreasing the frequency of the consequent through transactions that support the rule. This process goes on until the rule con dence is below the minimum threshold. This algorithm decreases the frequency of the sensitive rules until either their con dence is below the min conf threshold or their support is below the min supp threshold. Figure 5 shows the sketch of algorithm 2.a; more details about the steps it requires are given in Figure 6 . erator creates output les in text format, which can be understood by the programs which implement our heuristics. The input to the synthetic data generator, among other parameters, is the database size (jDj), the number of literals appearing in the database (jIj) and the average number of items per transaction (ATL). We performed two trials for each of the three algorithms: the goal of the rst trial was to analyze the behavior of the developed algorithms when the number of literals appearing in the database increases; the second trial aimed at studying the behavior of the algorithms when the number of rules selected for hiding (jR h j) increases.
For the rst trial we generated 10 datasets of size 1K, 1:5K, 2:5K, 4:2K, 5K, 6:7K, 7:5K, 8K, 9K and 10K respectively, for each tested value of jIj. Each one of the generated databases has an average transaction length of 5 items. Since we tested our algorithms for Table 5 : The datasets used in the rst trial.
databases (one for each value of jIj). Details about the characteristics of the datasets, used in our rst trial, are given in Table 5 . For the representation of the datasets in each series we used the compact notation 10: 1k..10k] to indicate that each series is made up of 10 databases and that the size of each database lies in the range 1k-10k.
The parameter jR h j in Table 5 indicates that in our rst trial we ran the proposed algorithms in order to hide a set of 2 disjoint rules (randomly selected among those having minimum con dence). For the second trial, we used the rst series of 10 datasets of Table 5 to hide sets of 2, 3 and 4 rules; Figure 5 : Sketch of Algorithm 2.a and jR h j for our second trial. In the rest of this section we will present a brief analysis for each one of the algorithms, followed by a discussion of the results obtained from the above experiments.
Series jDj jIj jR h j ATL Table 5 the rule R j , jDj is the number of transactions in the database, jIj is the number of literals in D and jT j1 j is Table 5 the number of transactions partially supporting the left side of R j during the rst execution of the inner loop. We ran the experiments discussed at the beginning of this section using algorithm 1.a to hide 2 disjoint rules, under the constraint N(R j ) = 3. The signi cance of xing the value of N(R j ) is to simulate the hypothesis that rules with similar support and con dence are chosen for hiding in each dataset. From Figure 9 and 10 we can easily observe that -under the above constraint -our algorithm 1.a is linear in the size of the database and directly proportional to jIj (Figure 9) and to jR h j (Figure 10 ). jT j1 j log jT j1 j + jR j j jIj jRjg) time, where jR j j is the number of literals that appear in the rule R j , jRj is the number of rules that can be mined from the database D and j ranges from 1 to jR h j. Figure 13 and 14 show the results of the trials discussed at the beginning of this section, when using algorithm 2.a to hide the rules. Again, if the same rules where chosen for hiding in each dataset, algorithm 2.a would perform in a time directly proportional to the size of the database. Its time requirements would also increase linearly when increasing the number of literals appearing in the database or the number of rules selected for hiding. We now give a brief description of how each data structure has been implemented. For the SET OF ELEMENTS data structure we adopted the following implementation: each set has been represented as an array of references to the elements of this set. These elements can be: transactions for D and T, rules for R h and large itemsets for R. The elements of a set have been represented as arrays. According to this convention, each transaction t is an array, with one eld storing the transaction ID (TID), another one storing the list of items contained in a transaction and still another one storing the number of these items. The list of items has been implemented as a hash structure which has literals for keys and integers for values. The number of keys equals I and the value associated with each key is either 1 or 0, depending whether the literal is supported by the transaction or not. The same implementation has been adopted to represent the list of items contained in a large itemset, which turns out to be an array with one eld for the list of items and one led storing the support. Each rule U has been implemented as an array with 4 elds, storing the con dence of the rule, a reference to the large itemsets representing the rule antecedent and the rule consequent and a reference to the large itemset from which the rule has been derived. Finally, to represent the list I of literals appearing in the database, we used an array of strings.
Analysis and Performance
Generation of the set T The set T of transactions Choosing the best transaction (Algorithm 1.b)
The decrease in the frequency of an itemset l, is made through a transaction that minimizes the side-e ects in the remaining set of rules. This transaction is selected among the set of transactions that support l, and it is the one with a minimum number of non-zero items. To do this, we sort the set T in decreasing order of size of transactions and then pick the rst transaction from T.
Choosing the best item (Algorithm 1.b) The best item (in a large itemset l) to delete from a transaction t is chosen so to have the minimum impact on the set of large itemsets. To do this, we determine all the (jlj?1)-itemsets and pick one item from (jlj?1)-itemset with the lowest support.
Conclusions
To protect sensitive rules from disclosure, two main approaches can be adopted. We can either prevent rules from being generated, by hiding the frequent sets from which they are derived, or we can reduce their importance by setting their con dence below a user-speci ed threshold. We developed three strategies that hide sensitive association rules based on these two approaches. These strategies work either on the support or on the con dence of the rules, by decreasing either one of these until the rule is not important. Some assumptions have been made when developing these strategies. We are currently considering extensions on these algorithms by dropping these assumptions. We also need to de ne some metrics to measure the impact that our algorithms have on the source database. Another interesting issue which we will be investigating, is the applicability of the ideas introduced in this paper to other data mining contexts, such as classi cation mining, clustering, etc.
